Twenty questions, about ten minutes. Answer for the operation as it runs today rather than as the manual describes it, and the score will be worth something.
1. Our executive leadership demonstrates its commitment to safety through actions, not just through written policy or statements. Leadership's actions consistently prioritize safety over conflicting pressures. Leadership supports safety on paper, but actions often prioritize production/cost. Safety commitment is rarely visible in leadership's decisions or resource allocation.
2. Safety performance and risk issues are regular agenda items at high-level management meetings, independent of any recent accident or incident. Safety is a standing, in-depth topic at all executive and board meetings. Safety is discussed primarily after an incident or only briefly in routine reports. Safety is rarely, if ever, a significant topic at high-level meetings.
3. We allocate adequate resources (staffing, budget, and time) to maintain our safety-critical systems and defense barriers. Resources are consistently assessed and fully allocated to meet safety needs. Resources are often tight, requiring trade-offs that sometimes impact safety maintenance. Resources for safety are chronically insufficient, leading to backlogs and weaknesses.
4. Safety-related roles (e.g., Safety Manager, Quality Auditor) are regarded as prestigious and career-enhancing appointments within the company. These roles are seen as highly valued and are stepping stones to senior management positions. The roles are necessary, but sometimes viewed as a side-step or administrative burden. Assignment to a safety role is often seen as a career dead end or demotion.
5. Employees feel safe and encouraged to report errors, near-misses, and hazards without fear of disciplinary action or reprisal. Employees routinely report, confident that non-punitive policies are followed. Employees report some issues, but are hesitant on high-profile or personal mistakes. Employees are fearful of reporting due to past punitive actions or perceived blame culture.
6. When an operational failure occurs, our initial priority is to identify and fix the failed system defenses, rather than immediately seeking to blame an individual. Investigations focus on systemic and organizational factors first and foremost. Investigations acknowledge system flaws, but often stop after identifying the 'last person.' The immediate goal is typically to find and discipline the person responsible.
7. The organization has a clear and negotiated distinction between honest human error, deliberate at-risk behavior, and reckless conduct. Policy clearly defines what is blameless error versus culpable behavior. A policy exists, but its application is inconsistent or unclear to the average employee. Disciplinary actions are subjective and lack a clear, agreed-upon framework.
8. Staff receive rapid, useful, and intelligible feedback regarding the issues they have reported, demonstrating that their input is valued and acted upon. A robust feedback system ensures timely closure and communication on all reports. Feedback is provided, but it is often delayed, vague, or only for selected reports. Reports frequently 'go into a black hole' with no follow-up or learning communicated.
9. The confidentiality of safety reports (where anonymity is requested) is consistently maintained and respected by all levels of management. Confidentiality is strictly protected and upheld across all internal processes. Confidentiality is respected, but there have been occasional breaches/perceived leaks. Employees doubt the anonymity of the system and fear being identified through their report.
10. We regularly conduct 'safety health checks' (e.g., proactive audits, safety culture surveys) to identify and remove potential error traps and organizational weaknesses. Proactive monitoring tools are used to assess system performance before failures occur. We conduct audits, but they focus more on compliance than organizational health checks. We primarily act only after an incident or when regulatory non-compliance is identified.
11. Safety decisions are based on the analysis of both reactive data (incidents, near-misses) and proactive data (audit findings, trend analysis of safety indicators). Decisions are driven by a balanced view of lagging (reactive) and leading (proactive) indicators. We collect both, but decisions are disproportionately driven by reactive incident data. Decisions are based almost entirely on recent incidents or near-misses.
12. We actively use simulation, workshops, or other methods to brainstorm new failure scenarios to test the resilience of our safety systems. We routinely conduct forward-looking risk modeling and 'what-if' planning sessions. Scenario planning is limited to required exercises (e.g., emergency response drills). We rarely spend time contemplating failures that haven't happened yet.
13. There are transparent processes in place to effectively resolve conflicts that arise between operational/commercial goals and safety requirements. A defined, formal process ensures safety requirements always prevail when in conflict. Conflicts are resolved case-by-case, sometimes in favor of commercial pressure. Safety requirements are frequently overridden by operational or commercial goals.
14. Our training programs specifically emphasize Non-Technical Skills (e.g., threat and error management, communication, decision-making) alongside technical proficiency. NTS are formally trained, assessed, and reinforced throughout a staff member's career. NTS are mentioned, but technical skills dominate training time and evaluation. Training is entirely focused on technical task performance and regulatory compliance.
15. Line management expects staff to be mindful of potential dangers and to anticipate ways they might fail or make an error. A state of 'chronic unease' and vigilance is a cultural norm and is encouraged by management. Staff are aware of safety, but proactive error-proofing is not a strong daily focus. Management prioritizes speed, assuming competence ensures safety.
16. Staff are trained and empowered to detect and recover from inevitable human errors, viewing setbacks as learning opportunities. Recovery skills are a core part of training, and the system is designed to tolerate errors. Staff are expected to recover, but the focus remains on preventing the initial error. Errors are treated strictly as individual failures with little emphasis on recovery or learning.
17. The lessons learned from internal incidents, audit findings, or even issues at other organizations are systematically communicated and integrated into our daily procedures and training. We formally analyze and apply lessons from all safety data. Lessons are shared, but procedures and training rarely change. We rarely apply lessons learned unless specifically directed to do so by a regulator.
18. Before implementing significant changes (e.g., new equipment, revised procedures, staffing reductions), we conduct a formal risk assessment to anticipate the potential impact on safety. A Management of Change (MOC) process is mandatory for any significant alteration. MOC applies to major changes but is often skipped for minor ones. Changes are implemented quickly without a formal, upfront risk assessment process.
19. There is effective, multi-directional communication about safety risks between operational departments (e.g., maintenance, flight operations, ground handling) and senior management. Departments share safety insights, and management supports collaboration. Communication is mostly top-down, and safety data stays siloed. Departments operate independently with little to no sharing of their specific safety risks.
20. Frontline employees are actively involved in the design and review of operational procedures and safety defense barriers, not just expected to follow them. Operational staff are valued experts involved in creating and reviewing procedures. Employees are consulted late in the process, mainly for review rather than design input. Procedures are written by management or technical writers and handed down to the operators.
